Introduction
Throughout Europe, the current economic and …nancial crisis has had a severe impact on incomes and employment. While the magnitude of the shocks is usually measured at the macro level, the resulting welfare e¤ects depend not only on the total size of losses but also on their distribution across di¤erent groups of society and the cushioning e¤ect of the tax bene…t system. This paper investigates to what extent the tax and transfer system protects households at di¤erent income levels and in di¤erent European countries against income losses and unemployment. 1 As micro data for an ex-post distributional analysis of the current crisis will become available with a considerable time lag, it is interesting to explore the e¤ects of stylized shocks on the income distribution ex-ante in order to assess the likely distribution of changes in market income and how they translate to changes in disposable income. While this is not a forecasting exercise, our approach does help to understand potential distributional implications of the current economic crisis. What can we learn from past recessions? Heathcote et al. (forthcoming) refer to the period from 1967-2006 and show for the US that low income households su¤er the largest earnings declines in recessions. Households from top percentiles are much less a¤ected which in turn leads to an increase in earnings equality. However, inequality in disposable income rises less than earnings inequality since government transfers, which constitute a large part of disposable income for households at the bottom of the earnings distribution, partly o¤set income losses. The cushioning role of the government in mitigating increases in earnings inequality can be substantial as is shown by Domeij and Floden (forthcoming) for Sweden, a country with a larger government compared to the US. In Sweden's severe 1992 recession, earnings inequality increased dramatically whereas inequality in disposable income almost remained at its before-crisis level.
Given the experience from past recessions, the question is whether the current economic crisis will have similar distributional consequences. Heathcote et al. (forthcoming) , who use the latest US data, show that inequality in disposable income slightly went up in 2008. However, data for 2009 are not available yet, so it is too early for an overall ex-post evaluation of the current crisis. Other simulation 1 Previous research has shown that European tax and transfer systems substantially vary in the degree of automatic income stabilization (Dolls et al. (2009)) . But this literature focuses on aggregate automatic stabilization whereas we are interested in income stabilization at di¤erent income levels. 1 studies provide a range of scenarios to assess likely distributional e¤ects. Bargain et al. (2010) use matched employer-employee data to estimate labor demand in Germany and predict employment e¤ects in response to output shocks. They …nd that low-skilled and part-time/irregular workers face higher risks of employment cuts. In some sectors, but not on average, the same is true for younger and older workers. Callan et al. (2010) analyze the distributional impact of recent public sector pay cuts in Ireland and conclude that they have an immediate inequality reducing e¤ect, though further conclusions depend on the speci…c implementation.
It is the purpose of this paper to analyze the e¤ects of macro shocks on the income distribution and the role of the tax bene…t system to cushion these impacts. We focus on 19 European countries for which a European multi-country microsimulation model is available (EUROMOD). We run two controlled experiments of macro shocks to income and employment in a common microeconometric framework. The …rst shock is a proportional decline in household gross income by …ve per cent (income shock). This is the usual way of modeling shocks in simulation studies analyzing automatic stabilizers (Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) , Mabbett and Schelkle (2007) , Dolls et al. (2009) ). But economic downturns typically a¤ect households asymmetrically, with some households losing their jobs and su¤ering a sharp decline in income and other households being much less a¤ected, as wages are usually rigid in the short term. We therefore consider a second macro shock where the unemployment rate increases such that total household income decreases by 5% (unemployment shock).
For both scenarios, we compute measures of inequality, poverty and richness to assess the distributional impact of the macro shocks. This analysis enables us to explore diverse e¤ects of the shock scenarios. Further on, we identify how much weight existing pre-crisis tax bene…t systems put on di¤erent income groups to protect them from income losses. In the next step, we compare the e¤ects across countries in order to evaluate the cushioning e¤ect of di¤erent welfare state regimes and to cluster the countries according to their stabilizing e¤ect on the income distribution.
We …nd that the proportional income shock leads to a reduction in inequality whereas distributional implications of the asymmetric unemployment shock crucially depend on which income groups are a¤ected by rising unemployment. Both shocks increase the headcount ratio for poverty and decrease the counterpart for richness. Turning next to subgroup decompositions, we conclude that European tax bene…t systems place unequal weights on the extent how di¤erent income groups are pro-tected. In case of the unemployment shock, some Eastern and Southern European countries provide little income stabilization for low income groups whereas the opposite is true for the majority of Nordic and continental European countries. With respect to the relationship between income stabilization and redistribution, we …nd that tax bene…t systems with high build-in automatic stabilizers are also those which are more e¤ective in mitigating existing inequalities in market income.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the microsimulation model EUROMOD and the di¤erent shock scenarios we consider. In Section 3, we provide an institutional overview of tax and transfer systems in Europe and brie ‡y show empirical evidence on pre-and post-tax inequality in European countries as was the case before the start of the current economic crisis. Section 4 presents the results of the distributional analysis and Section 5 concludes.
Data and methodology

Microsimulation using EUROMOD
We use microsimulation techniques to simulate taxes, bene…ts and disposable income under di¤erent scenarios for a representative micro-data sample of households. Simulation analysis allows conducting a controlled experiment by changing the parameters of interest while holding everything else constant (cf. Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006) ). We therefore do not have to deal with endogeneity problems when identifying the e¤ects of the policy reform under consideration.
Simulations are carried out using EUROMOD, a static tax-bene…t model for 19 EU countries 2 , which was designed for comparative analysis. 3 EUROMOD is characterised by greater ‡exibility than typical national models, to accommodate a range of di¤erent tax-bene…t systems. For instance, the model can easily handle di¤erent units of assessment, income de…nitions for tax bases and bene…t means-tests, the order and structure of instruments. Overall, a common framework allows the comparison of countries in a consistent way. EUROMOD can simulate most direct taxes and bene…ts except those based on previous contributions as this information is usually not available from the crosssectional survey data used as input datasets. Information on these instruments is taken directly from the original data sources. The model assumes full bene…t takeup and tax compliance, focusing on the intended e¤ects of tax-bene…t systems. The main stages of the simulations are the following. First, a micro-data sample and tax-bene…t rules are read into the model. Then for each tax and bene…t instrument, the model constructs corresponding assessment units, ascertains which are eligible for that instrument and determines the amount of bene…t or tax liability for each member of the unit. Finally, after all taxes and bene…ts in question are simulated, disposable income is calculated.
Scenarios
The existing literature on income stabilization through the tax and transfer system has concentrated on increases in earnings or gross incomes to examine the stabilizing impact of tax bene…t systems (cf. Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) , Mabbett and Schelkle (2007) ). In the light of the current economic crisis, there is much more interest in a downturn scenario. Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2009) stress that recessions which follow a …nancial crisis have particularly severe e¤ects on asset prices, output and unemployment. Therefore, we are interested not only in a scenario of a uniform decrease in incomes but also in an increase of the unemployment rate. We compare a scenario where gross incomes are proportionally decreased by 5% for all households (income shock) to a scenario where some households are made unemployed and therefore lose all their labor earnings (unemployment shock). In the latter scenario, the unemployment rate increases such that total household income decreases by 5% as well in order to make both scenarios as comparable as possible. 4 The increase of the unemployment rate is modeled through reweighting of our samples. 5 The weights of the unemployed are increased while those of the employed 4 Our scenarios can be seen as a conservative estimate of the expected impact of the current crisis (see Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2009) for e¤ects of previous crises). The (qualitative) results are robust with respect to di¤erent sizes of the shocks. The results for the unemployment shock do not change much when we model it as an increase of the unemployment rate by 5 percentage points for each country. 5 For the reweigthing procedure, we follow the approach of Immvervoll et al. (2006) 
However, one problem when computing I with macro data is that this data includes behavioral and general equilibrium e¤ects as well as active policy. Therefore, a measure of automatic stabilization based on macro data captures all these e¤ects. In order to single out the pure size of automatic stabilization, we compute I using arithmetic changes ( ) in total disposable income (
Thus, the coe¢ cient can be decomposed into its components which include taxes, social insurance contributions and bene…ts:
The main results of Dolls et al. (2009) are shown in Figure 1 . 7 In case of the income shock (upper panel), approximately 38% of the shock would be absorbed by automatic stabilizers in the EU. Within the EU, there is considerable heterogeneity, and results for overall stabilization of disposable income range from a value of 25% for Estonia to 56% in Denmark. In general, automatic stabilizers in Eastern and Southern European countries are considerably lower than in Continental and Northern European countries. In case of the unemployment shock (lower panel), automatic stabilizers absorb 47% of the shock in the EU, thus exceeding stabilization in case of the income shock by 9 percentage points. The decomposition of overall stabilization into the components income taxes, social insurance contributions and bene…ts shows that bene…ts accounting for 40% of overall stabilization are a main driver of disposable income stabilization. Highest values for I are again found in the Nordic countries 7 In this paper, we also analyze the importance of liquidity constraints for demand stabilization.
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Denmark and Sweden whereas automatic stabilizers in Estonia, Italy and Poland are at the lower end. 
Inequality measurement
Let an income distribution be a random variable X = (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n ); where x i 0 is the income of individual i; i = 1; :::n: The Gini coe¢ cient of inequality is de…ned as:
In case of maximum inequality, I Gini corresponds to one, and in the case that all values are equal, I Gini corresponds to zero.
We use disposable income de…ned as market income minus direct taxes and social contributions plus cash bene…ts (including pensions) for our distributional analyses. The unit of analysis is the individual. To compensate for di¤erent household structures and possible economies of scale in households, we use equivalent incomes throughout the analyses. For each person, the equivalent (per-capita) total disposable income is its household's total disposable income divided by the equivalent household size according to the modi…ed OECD scale. The existing income tax systems in the 19 European countries under consideration o¤er considerable variety. As Table 1 shows, all Western European countries in our sample have graduated rate schedules with a number of brackets ranging from 2 (Ireland) to 16 (Luxembourg), with the top marginal income tax rate ranging from 38% (Luxembourg) to 59% in Denmark. There are also considerable di¤erences across the Eastern European countries. Estonia has a ‡at tax system, with a single rate of 22% and a basic allowance of 1.304 Euro, while the other Eastern European countries in our sample apply graduated tax schedules with a comparatively small number of brackets (2-3) and relatively low top marginal rates. Interestingly, Slovenia and Poland have very similar income tax schedules as the Western European countries, with highest rates around 40%, but with a lower amount belonging to the 0% bracket.
European countries do not only di¤er in their income tax schedules but also in the design of their system of social protection and redistribution. In each country, direct and indirect taxes as well as social insurance contributions (SIC) are used to …nance the welfare state (see Table 2 for an overview). The weight in the tax mix of these components depends on the structural design of the tax bene…t system in each country. For the Continental countries it is evident that the SIC are more important to …nance the welfare state than the direct taxes. This is also true for Eastern Europe, while in the Nordic countries the SIC play only a minor role. Denmark relies almost exclusively on taxes for …nancing the welfare state. In Southern European countries, indirect taxes tend to play the most important role. This is even more true for Eastern Europe. With few exceptions, there is a north-to-south and west-to-east decline with respect to the ratio of direct taxes and social insurance contributions to indirect taxes. The level of social protection (in terms of expenditures as % of GDP) is high in Nordic and Continental countries (an exception is Luxembourg) and particularly low in Eastern Europe as well as Ireland. A perhaps trivial but still interesting observation from Table 2 is that the level of social expenditures is correlated with the level of taxes and contributions.
Distribution and Redistribution
How do European countries di¤er in terms of pre-tax and post-tax inequality? The Table 3 indicates that inequality in market income, Y M i , as measured by the Gini coe¢ cient, displays huge disparities among the European countries of our sample. Coe¢ cients range from 0.39 to 0.55, with values above 0.5 in some Southern and Eastern European countries (Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Portugal and Slovenia). At the lower end, the Netherlands is the only country with a Gini coe¢ cient for equivalised market income which is below 0.4. Closest to the Netherlands are Sweden and Austria, both with values below 0.45.
Column 2 shows that post-tax inequality, i.e. the Gini coe¢ cient based on disposable income, is substantially lower than pre-tax inequality in all countries. Thus, existing inequalities in market income are mitigated by European tax bene…t systems through a substantial degree of redistribution. Although there are signi…cant di¤erences in the size of redistribution, the overall inequality ranking of the countries basically remains the same.
Finally, the last two columns of Table 3 show the absolute and relative di¤erences between the pre-and post-tax Gini coe¢ cients as measures of redistribution (see Table 3 : Distribution and redistribution in the baseline G also Fuest et al. (2010) ). In countries such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Hungary or Luxembourg, tax bene…t systems reduce inequalities in market income by almost 50%. At the other end of the spectrum, we …nd lowest redistribution in Portugal and Italy with a reduction in inequality of approximately 30%.
4 E¤ects of shocks on income distribution
Overall distribution
What are the distributional consequences of the two macro shocks described above? Table 4 shows the percentage changes in the Gini coe¢ cient and in the headcount ratios for being poor or rich, all based on equivalent disposable income. While the proportional income shock (IS) leads to a reduction of the Gini coe¢ -cient in all countries, the asymmetric unemployment shock (US) increases inequality in 15 out of 19 countries. In the latter case, we …nd a reduction of the Gini coe¢ -cient only in Denmark, Luxembourg, Portugal and Sweden. In the case of the income shock, the largest reductions of the Gini coe¢ cient occur in Belgium, Denmark, Sweden and the UK (all >2%), the smallest ones in Greece and Slovenia (each <0.5%). In the case of the unemployment shock, distributional implications crucially depend on which income groups are hardest hit by unemployment and income losses. If low income groups are the …rst who loose their jobs during a recession, one can expect an increase in inequality. However, if also middle or upper income groups are a¤ected which seems to be relevant especially in long-lasting recessions such as the current one, distributional implications become more ambiguous. This ambiguity in terms of distributional e¤ects of an asymmetric shock is re ‡ected in the positive and negative signs of the Gini change.
Comparing the headcount ratios for both shock scenarios, we can conclude that, not surprisingly, in case of the unemployment shock richness is decreasing less than in the case of the proportional income shock.
9 With the exception of Slovenia, the percentage reduction of rich people is substantially higher in the latter shock scenario. However, no such clear conclusion can be drawn considering the percentage change in poverty. In countries such as Ireland or the United Kingdom, the asymmetric unemployment shock leads to a much stronger increase in the headcount for the poor than the income shock. However, the opposite is true for countries such as Greece, Luxembourg or the Netherlands. Here, distributional implications depend again crucially on which income groups are actually the …rst who become unemployed in a recession.
What is the e¤ect of the two shock scenarios on market income inequality and the amount of redistribution achieved by the tax and transfer system? Table 5 sheds further light on the implications for the overall income distribution. The …rst column shows the percentage change of the Gini coe¢ cient based on equivalised market income between the unemployment shock scenario and the baseline ((G
10 With the exception of Portugal, we …nd an increase in inequality which is highest in Ireland, Denmark, the UK and Sweden (all > 2%) and lowest in Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland and Slovenia (all < 1%). The last two columns of Table 5 show how the di¤erence between the Gini coef…cients based on equivalised disposable and market income has changed comparing the income shock and the base scenario (column 3) and the unemployment shock and the base scenario (column 4), respectively ((G
The negative values indicate that both shocks lead to higher di¤erences between the Gini coe¢ cients based on equivalised disposable and market income. One conclusion of this …nding is that post-shock inequalities in market income are even more reduced than in the base scenario, i.e. the automatic stabilizers increase the redistributive e¤ects of the tax bene…t systems in all countries in both scenarios. 
Stabilization of di¤erent income groups
In this section, we refer to the income stabilization coe¢ cient from Section 2.3, but focus on the stabilization of disposable income for di¤erent income groups. The income stabilization coe¢ cient for quantile q becomes:
Note that in the denominator, changes in market income for the total population are added up -as in equation (5). Hence, the sum of the …ve quantile coe¢ cients yields the overall income stabilization coe¢ cient. Table 6 shows that in case of the proportional income shock, the stabilization coe¢ cients are an increasing function of the income quantiles. This result is due to higher changes between market and disposable income for high income groups. It is worth mentioning that even a proportional tax would yield increasing coe¢ cients for higher quantiles, i.e. progressivity of the income tax is not required for this result.
In contrast to the increasing stabilization by income quantile for the income shock, stabilization results for the unemployment shock follow a somewhat di¤erent pattern as demonstrated in Table 7 . Here, with the exception of some Eastern and Southern European countries, we …nd high stabilization also for the lowest income groups. As the unemployment shock is modeled through reweighting of our sample taking into account individual characteristics of the unemployed, a large part of the newly unemployed comes from lower income quantiles. The fact that tax and transfer systems in countries such as Estonia, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia or Spain provide only weak stabilization for low income groups can be explained by rather low unemployment bene…ts in these countries. To further investigate which components of the tax and transfer systems drive the results for the …ve income quantiles, we decompose the income stabilization coe¢ cient I q into its components income taxes, social insurance contributions (SIC) and bene…ts (Tables 9 and 10 in the Appendix). First, consider Table 9 for the income shock scenario. Clearly, taxes and, to a smaller extent SIC, play a large stabilizing role for higher income quantiles whereas bene…ts are of minor importance for these income groups. This holds for all countries in our sample. Only in France, SIC are almost as important (…fth quantile) or even more important (fourth quantile) than taxes for stabilization of disposable income which can be explained with the progressive incidence of SIC. At the bottom of the distribution, stabilization of disposable income is rather low due to smaller changes in market income.
A di¤erent picture emerges again for the unemployment shock (Table 10 ). In this shock scenario, bene…ts play an important role, especially for low income quantiles. The decomposition convincingly shows which component of the tax and transfer systems causes the di¤erence between Southern and Eastern European countries on the one hand and its neighbors on the other. The former group of countries has a rather low level of income stabilization mainly because unemployment bene…ts are substantially less generous in these countries.
Income stabilization and redistribution
It is interesting to explore the relationship between the degree of income stabilization and redistribution which is achieved by the respective tax and transfer systems. Are systems with high automatic stabilizers also those which provide signi…cant redistribution? To answer this question, we relate the degree of redistribution measured by the percentage di¤erence in the Gini coe¢ cients based on market and disposable income to the income stabilization coe¢ cients for the income shock (Figure 2 ) and the unemployment shock ( Figure 5 in the Appendix). The strong relationship between income stabilization and redistribution is re ‡ected in very high (populationweighted) correlations of 0.67 (IS) and 0.86 (US). Next, we consider the relationship between the income stabilization coe¢ cient and the ratio of direct to indirect taxes. We …nd a strong positive correlation of 0.67 (Figure 3 ). This is not surprising since the income stabilization coe¢ cient positively depends on the level of direct taxes. In contrast, the mechanism how indirect taxes provide automatic stabilization is di¤erent as discussed in Dolls et al. (2009) . There, we also …nd a positive relationship between the income stabilization and government size and openness, respectively, whereas no correlation is found between automatic stabilizers and active …scal policy measures passed during the current economic crisis. Table 8 shows the results of regressing the income stabilization coe¢ cient (of the income shock) on our measure for redistribution, a measure for openness and the ratio of direct to indirect taxes. Redistribution is again measured as the percentage di¤erence in the Gini coe¢ cients based on market and disposable income and openness as the average ratio of exports and imports to GDP from 2000-2004. Due to the very small sample size (N = 19), this inference should be interpreted with caution. Having this in mind, the signi…cant positive relationships between automatic stabilizers and each of the variables is also con…rmed by this "naïve" regression. Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD. Note: S.E. in parentheses. Signi…cance level: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Cluster Analysis
In order to compare the clustering of countries with respect to the di¤erent measures of automatic stabilization and controlling for several variables, we conduct a hierarchical cluster analysis to group countries that have similar characteristics across a set of variables. When performing a cluster analysis, a number of technical decisions have to be made. First, all variables have been standardized from 0 to 1 using z-scores, to prevent that the results are driven by large absolute values of some variables. Our method of grouping the countries is the common Ward's linkage, which combines such clusters which minimally increase the squared sum of errors. Our results will be illustrated in a so-called dendrogram, which graphically presents the information concerning which observations are grouped together at various levels of (dis)similarity. At the bottom of the dendrogram, each observation is considered as its own cluster. Vertical lines extend up for each observation, and at various (dis)similarity values these lines are connected to the lines from other observations with a horizontal line. The observations continue to combine, until, at the top of the dendrogram, all observations are grouped together. The height of the vertical lines and the range of the (dis)similarity axis give visual clues about the strength of the clustering. In our case, the measure for the distance between cases is the common 'squared Euclidean'. Generally, long vertical lines indicate more distinct separation between groups, short lines more similarity, respectively. We perform a cluster analysis on the basis of the stabilization coe¢ cients for the income and unemployment shock combined with inequality in market income and the ratio of direct to indirect taxes. The dendogram is illustrated in Figure 4 . In accordance with the classical typology of welfare state regimes (Esping-Andersen (1990) and Ferrera (1996) ), the dendogram groups Continental and Nordic countries to the left and Anglo-Saxon, Southern and Eastern European countries to the right. The former group is characterized by a rather high level of income stabiliza-tion, modest inequality in market income and an important role of direct taxes and SIC, whereas countries from the latter group tend to rank at the other end of the spectrum.
Conclusions
This paper investigates the extent to which the tax and transfer system mitigates negative income and employment shocks at di¤erent income levels and in di¤erent countries. We have considered the distributional consequences of two types of shocks: a proportional shock on all incomes and an increase in unemployment which a¤ects households asymmetrically. In both scenarios, post-shock inequalities in market income are even more reduced through the tax and transfer system than in the base scenario, i.e. the redistributive e¤ects of the tax bene…t systems increase in all countries.
Further, we investigate the degree of income stabilization for di¤erent income groups. In case of the proportional income shock, stabilization for higher income groups contributes relatively more to overall stabilization than stabilization for low income groups, but this is due to the larger absolute shock on gross income for the former group. A di¤erent pattern emerges in case of the unemployment shock. With the exception of some Eastern and Southern European countries, we …nd relatively high income stabilization coe¢ cients also for low income groups. The stabilization for high income groups is mainly driven by the income tax. A notable exception to this is France where (progressive) social insurance contributions are most important for stabilization. For low income groups whose tax payments are negligible, bene…ts play a central role. As they are more generous in the Scandinavian and Western European countries, they contribute substantially more to stabilization of disposable income for lower income groups. We thus conclude that European tax bene…t systems put unequal weights on the extent di¤erent income groups are protected against macro shocks.
With respect to the relationship between income stabilization and redistribution, we …nd that tax bene…t systems with high automatic stabilizers are also those which are more e¤ective in mitigating existing inequalities in market income. A simple regression of income stabilization on measures for openness, redistribution and the ratio of direct to indirect taxes con…rms a signi…cant positive relationship between the automatic stabilizers and each of the variables.
These results have to be interpreted in the light of various limitations of our analysis. Firstly, by modeling the unemployment shock through reweighting of the sample, we implicitly assume that the socio-demographic characteristics of the unemployed remain constant. Secondly, our analysis abstracts from automatic stabilization through other taxes, in particular corporate income taxes.
12 Thirdly, we have abstracted from the role of labor supply or other behavioral adjustments for the impact of automatic stabilizers. We intend to pursue these issues in future research.
12 For an analysis of automatic stabilizers in the corporate tax system see Devereux and Fuest (2009) and Buettner and Fuest (forthcoming) .
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A Appendix:
A.1 Additional results 
A.2 Reweighting procedure for increasing unemployment
In order to increase the unemployment rate while keeping the aggregate counts of other key individual and household characteristics constant, we follow the approach taken by Immvervoll et al. (2006) . The increase of the unemployment rates is modeled through reweighting of our samples while controlling for several individual and household characteristics that determine the risk of becoming unemployed. We follow Immvervoll et al. (2006) and de…ne the unemployed as people aged 19-59 declaring themselves to be out of work and looking for a job. The withindatabase national 'unemployment rate'is calculated as the ratio of these unemployed to those in the labor force, de…ned as the unemployed plus people aged 19-59 who are (self)employed. The increased total number of unemployed people is calculated such that total household income decreases by 5% within each country.
In EUROMOD, the baseline household weights supplied with the national databases have been calculated to adjust for sample design and/or di¤erential nonresponse (see Sutherland (2001) for details). Weights are then recalculated using the existing weights as a starting point, but (a) using the increased (decreased) number of unemployed (employed) people as the control totals for them, and (b) also controlling for individual demographic and household composition variables using the existing grossed-up totals for these categories as control totals. The speci…c variables used as controls are: employment status age (0-18, 19-24, 25-49, 50-59, 60+) gender marital status and household size education region This method implies that the households without any unemployed people that are similar to households with unemployed people (according to the above variables) will have their weights reduced. In other words, these are the households who are 'made unemployed'in our exercise.
